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Abstract
Empirical evidence shows that an increase in trade liberalisation
causes an increase in foreign direct investments (FDIs). Here we pro-
pose an explanation to this apparent puzzle by exploiting the inten-
sity of competition in a Bertrand duopoly with convex costs where
the two rms enter in a new market. We adopt Dastidars (1995)
approach, delivering a continuum of Bertrand-Nash equilibria ranging
above marginal cost pricing, to show that softening competition may
indeed more than o¤set the standard e¤ect generated by trade costs,
thereby leading to a positive relationship between trade liberalisation
and FDIs.
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1 Introduction
The standard theory of multinational corporations suggests that a decrease
in trade tari¤s would reduce the amount of foreign direct investment (FDI).1
Indeed, the adoption of FDIs has the aim to avoid tari¤s by installing pro-
ductive capacity in the country of the market where the rm operates (the
so-called tari¤-jumping argument). Nonetheless, stylised facts on FDIs show
that the increase in trade liberalisation has led in fact to an increase in the
volume of FDIs.2 In a recent contribution, Collie (2011) explains this para-
dox in a setting with two regions and two countries in each of them, Cournot
competition and linear costs. He shows that multilateral trade liberalisa-
tion may induce rms to shift from exporting to FDIs if the inter-regional
transport cost is su¢ ciently high.3
We propose an alternative explanation in a setting where two Bertrand
rms, supplying a homogeneous good with a convex cost function, enter the
market of a foreign country. They choose between exporting, which involves
a linear cost associated with either shipping or tari¤s, or undertaking FDIs,
involving a sunk cost. We model Bertrand competition as in Dastidar (1995),
yielding a continuum of Nash equilibria, ranging also above marginal cost
pricing. Our results show that the paradox of an increase in FDI as trade
liberalisation increases can be explained on the basis of the intensity of price
competition in the host market, provided the FDI sunk costs are su¢ ciently
low for the FDI strategy to be viable.
1Some relevant contributions in this eld are Horstmann and Markusen (1992), Motta
(1992) and Rowthorn (1992), inter alia.
2See Maruksen (2002) and Barba Navaretti and Venables (2004).
3An alternative and solid explanation to this paradox can be found in the literature on
tax competition and FDI, according to which trade libelisation can increase FDI if coun-
tries favour foreign investments through a low taxation. Some noteworthy contributions
are Janeba (1995), Hauer and Wooton (1999, 2006), Ra¤ (2004) and Davies et al. (2010),
inter alia.
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2 The model
We consider a world with two countries, labelled 1 and 2. In country 1 there
are two rms, labelled A and B. They produce the same homogeneous good,
and have symmetric and convex production costs:
C = cq2; (1)
where q is the quantity produced by each rm and c > 0: Consider a scenario
in which both rms can supply the market of country 2, hosting no home
rms at all. Let the inverse demand expressed by consumers of country 2 be
linear:
p = 1  2q: (2)
Firms A and B can enter country 2 in two alternative ways, namely, by
(i) exporting from country 1 or (ii) undertaking FDIs. In the rst case, they
bear a cost t 2 (0; 1) for each unit exported, which can be interpreted either
as a transportation cost or a tari¤, and thus obtaining prots:
ex = pq   cq2   tq; (3)
while in the alternative case they incur the sunk costs k > 0, with prots:
FDI = pq   cq2   k: (4)
3 Results
According to Dastidar (1995), if rms have symmetric convex costs and com-
pete à la Bertrand, the Nash equilibrium is necessarily non-unique. In partic-
ular, a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium is characterised by both rms setting
the same price p, which is bounded by two thresholds pavc  p  pu: The
lower bound pavc (the superscript avc stands for average variable cost) equals
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average variable costs, letting rms be indi¤erent between either producing
at p or producing nothing at all. The upper bound pu (with superscript u
standing for undercutting) is the price at which rms are indi¤erent between
choosing price pu, and marginally undercutting it in order to capture the
entire demand at pu.
If both rms export their respective home plants, the level of pavc is given
by equating the inverse demand function to the average variable cost (which
includes the trading cost):
1  2q = cq + t; (5)
then solving for q and substituting in the demand function we obtain:
pavcex =
c+ 2t
2 + c
: (6)
The upper bound of the equilibrium price obtains by imposing indi¤erence
between duopoly prots (3) and the monopoly prots generated by under-
cutting:
pq   cq2   tq = 2pq   4cq2   2tq: (7)
Solving for p; we obtain
pucex =
3c+ 2t
2 + 3c
: (8)
Finally, by equating the inverse demand function to the marginal cost, solving
for q and substituting into p; we obtain the price equal to marginal cost:
pmcex =
c+ t
1 + c
; (9)
where the superscript mc stands for marginal cost pricing.
The continuum of Nash equilibria can be represented by the following
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expression:4
pex =
c+ (2  ) t
2 + c   : (10)
Parameter  represents the relative intensity of price competition between
rms. Note that, when  = 0; in equilibrium price equals average variable
cost;  = 1 corresponds to the Bertrand reference case in which price is equal
to marginal cost, while at  = 4=3 the price attains the highest level above
which undercutting takes place. As a consequence,  2 [0; 4=3] : Using (10),
the individual prot function (3) writes:
ex =
c (2  ) (1  t)2
4 (2 + c  )2 : (11)
The per-rm equilibrium prots obtained by undertaking FDI can be
easily found by setting t = 0 in equation (11) and subtracting the FDI sunk
cost k:
FDI =
c (2  )
4 (2 + c  )2   k: (12)
Of course, in order for FDI to be positive, the following condition must
hold:5
k < bk = c (2  )
4 (2 + c  )2 : (13)
the straightforward implication of (13) is that exporting is the only viable
strategy for all k > bk: By comparing ex with FDI , it emerges that FDI  
ex > 0 for all
k < ek = c (2  ) (2  t) t
4 (2 + c  )2 : (14)
Finally, note that:
bk   ek = c (2  ) (1  t)2
4 (2 + c  )2 > 0: (15)
4For an analogous application of Dastidars (1995) approach, see André et al. (2009).
5This must be imposed as we are not imposing the price to cover average total costs.
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This leads to the following proposition:
Proposition 1 For all k 2
h
0;eki, both rms undertake FDIs to install ca-
pacity in the host country. For all k > ek, both rms choose to export from
their home sites.
We are now in a position to exploit this result in order to explain the
puzzle for which trade liberalisation leads to an increase in the volume of
FDIs. This can be ascertained by evaluating the relationship between ek,
whose increase leads to an increase in FDI, and t; whose decrease leads to an
increase in trade liberalisation.
Totally di¤erentiating ek yields:
dek = c (2  ) (1  t)
2 (2 + c  )2 dt 
c [ (1 + c)  2  c] (2  t) t
4 (2 + c  )3 d: (16)
Examining (16), one observes that the coe¢ cient of dt is unambiguously pos-
itive for all admissible values of parameters. This feature is fully in line with
the established theoretical wisdom dating back to Horstmann and Markusen
(1992), Motta (1992) and Rowthorn (1992). Conversely, the coe¢ cient of d
is negative for all
 >
2 + c
1 + c
: (17)
Note that
2 + c
1 + c
 4
3
for all c  2; (18)
so that for c < 2, the sign of the coe¢ cient of d in (16) may change de-
pending on the level of . The ongoing discussion can be summarised in
Proposition 2 A positive relationship between trade liberalisation and FDI
arises in the parameter region identied by c < 2 and  2 ((2 + c) = (1 + c) ; 4=3).
That is, the standard e¤ect associated with trade liberalisation (i.e., a
positive relationship between trade costs and FDIs) can indeed be reversed if
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(i) marginal cost is su¢ ciently low and (ii) the intensity of price competition is
also su¢ ciently low. The intuitive reason is that increasing  in combination
with a low marginal cost expands the mark up and therefore makes it easier
for rms to bear the sunk cost of a new plant abroad.
Finally, we briey discuss the di¤erent implications on the social welfare
of the host country in the two alternative situations. In the case of export,
we will consider, alternatively, t as (i) a transportation cost or (ii) a tari¤.
If t is meant to be a transportation cost, the host countrys social welfare
trivially coincides with its own consumer surplus, i.e.:
W tcex =
(2  )2 (1  t)2
2 (2 + c  )2 ; (19)
where superscript tc stands for transportation cost. Obviously, any increase
in transportation costs hinders consumer surplus. Instead, if t is a tari¤, then
the tari¤ revenue contributes to the host countrys social welfare, together
with consumer surplus:
W taex =
(2  ) (1  t) [2  + t (2 (1 + c)  )]
2 (2 + c  )2 ; (20)
where the superscript ta stands for tari¤. Clearly, W taex > W
tc
ex: Moreover,
as t here becomes a policy instrument in the hands of the host countrys
government, is can be easily established that
@W taex
@t
/ c  t [2 (1 + c)  ] = 0 (21)
in
t =
c
2 (1 + c)  
Finally, in the case of FDI, again the host countrys social welfare is given
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by its consumer surplus (the same as (19), with t = 0):
WFDI =
(2  )2
2 (2 + c  )2 : (22)
We now compare the three alternatives. First note that WFDI > W tcex for all
t > 0, while WFDI < W taex for all:
t <
2c
2 (1 + c)  ; (23)
leading to
Corollary 3 The host countrys social welfare ranking is W taex > WFDI >
W tcex.
This amounts to saying that imports are preferred to FDIs if and only
if t can be controlled by the host country to generate revenues more than
o¤setting the negative e¤ect on consumer surplus.
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